In partial answer to a question posed by Arnie Miller [5] and X. Caicedo [2] we obtain sufficient conditions for an Lω 1 ,ω theory to have an independent axiomatization. As a consequence we obtain two corollaries: The first, assuming Vaught's Conjecture, every Lω 1 ,ω theory in a countable language has an independent axiomatization. The second, this time outright in ZFC, every intersection of a family of Borel sets can be formed as the intersection of a family of independent Borel sets.
Introduction
Definition 1. A set of sentences T ′ is called independent if for every φ ∈ T ′ , T ′ \ {φ} φ. A theory T is called independently axiomatizable, if there is a set T ′ which is independent and T and T ′ have exactly the same models.
Note that this definition applies to sets of sentences in both firstorder (Lω,ω) and infinitary (Lω 1 ,ω ) logic, granted that we have defined a meaning for |=. The question is whether every theory has an independent axiomatization. For first-order theories the answer is positive: Theorem 2. (M.I. ) All theories of any cardinality in Lω,ω, are independently axiomatizable.
For cardinalities greater than ℵ1, Caicedo obtained partial results for a weaker notion of countable independence, which requires that every countable subset of the set of sentences is independent. Our main result (theorem 26) states that Theorem 5. For a countable language L and for a theory T ⊂ Lω 1 ,ω , if the number of counterexamples to Vaught's Conjecture contained in T is small, then T is independently axiomatizable.
The meaning of a small number of counterexamples is made clear by definition 21. Vaught's conjecturestates
Conjecture (Vaught) Every sentence σ ∈ Lω 1 ,ω either has countable many non-isomorphic countable models, or else it has continuum many.
Under the Continuum Hypothesis the conjecture is trivially true and Morley proved that every counterexample to it will necessarily have ℵ1 many non-isomorphic countable models. Using theorem 5 we then obtain two consequences: Theorem 6. Assume Vaught's Conjecture. Then for any countable L and any theory T ⊂ Lω 1 ,ω , T is independently axiomatizable.
Definition 7. We call a collection of Borel sets B = {Bi|i ∈ I} independent if B = ∅ and for every i ∈ I, j =i Bj \ Bi = ∅.
Two collections B, B
′ are equivalent, if
Theorem 8. Let B be a collection of Borel sets. Then there is an independent collection of Borel sets B ′ with B = B ′ .
Preliminary work
Our results are about sentences in Lω 1 ,ω . When we refer to a sentence, we mean a sentence in Lω 1 ,ω and when we refer to a theory, we mean a theory of sentences in Lω 1 ,ω . If a theory T doesn't have any models, it is axiomatizable by the sentence ∃x(x = x), while any theory T is equivalent to the theory obtained by deleting from T all its valid sentences. Thus, we can assume that all the theories we work with are consistent and do not contain valid formulas. Throughout this paper we assume that the language L we are working with is countable. Then every theory T ⊂ Lω 1 ,ω can have size up to the continuum. Under the Continuum Hypothesis and using theorem 4, every theory is independently axiomatizable. So, it suffices to deal with the case that the Continuum Hypothesis fails and we will take this as one of our working assumptions.
Definition 9. Let φ a sentence. We say that the sentences {ψα|α ∈ I} partition φ if:
• for all α, ψα is consistent,
• |= φ ↔ α∈I ψα and
• for all α, |= ψα → β =α ¬ψ β What we are heading towards is to prove that under the assumption of a perfect set of countable models, we get a partition into continuum many sentences. If M is a countable model and a ∈ M, define the α-type of a in M inductively:
The α-types of M are defined to be all sentences of the form φ a,M α , for any a ∈ M, and if σ is a sentence, the α-types of σ are all sentences of the form φ a,M α with M |= σ and a ∈ M. If M is a countable model, then it realizes only countably many types and there is an ordinal δ < ω1 such that for all a, b ∈ M,
The least such ordinal δ we call the Scott height of M and write α(M). Then φ Now, observe that if α = γ + 1, some γ, then we can identity every φ a,M γ+1 with the set {φ
This enables us to consider Ψγ+1(φ) and Φγ+1(φ) as subsets of Xα(φ) := 2 Ψγ (φ) . In the special case that Ψγ (φ) is countable, Xα(φ) becomes a standard Borel space and we will prove (lemma13) that in this case Ψγ+1(φ) and Φγ+1(φ) are Σ . We can identify it with {φ(x)|φ atomic, M |= φ( a)}, in which case Ψ0(φ) and Φ0(φ) become subsets of X0(φ) := 2 A , with A being the set of all atomic, or negation of atomic sentences. Since we assumed that the language we work with is countable, A is countable and X0(φ) is a standard Borel space with Ψ0(φ) and Φ0(φ) Σ It is easily shown that M od(L) is a Polish space. For more on this one can consult [4] .
Definition 12. For a sentence σ let M od(σ) be the set of all models in M od(L) that satisfy σ.
This becomes a standard Borel space space by the Borel structure it inherits from M od(L) (cf. [4] too).
Lemma 13. Let φ be a Lω 1 ,ω -sentence, α < ω1, Ψα(φ), Φα(φ) and Xα(φ) as defined above. Assume that for all γ < α, Ψγ (φ) is countable. Then
is Borel and 2. Ψα(φ) and Φα(φ) are Σ Proof. Recall that under the countability assumption for the Ψγ 's, Xα(φ) becomes a standard Borel space with Ψα(φ) and Φα(φ) seen as subsets of it. Therefore, the statement of the theorem makes sense. Now, by induction on β ≤ α, it follows easily from the definition that the function
is Borel. In particular, the same is true for (M, a) → φ a,M α . Using this function we can write ψ ∈ Ψα iff ∃M∃ a ∈ M((M |= φ) and (ψ = φ a,M α )), and similarly
This proves the lemma.
If Ψα(φ) is as in the above lemma, then by the perfect set theorem for Σ 1 1 sets, it is either countable or has size continuum. If it is countable, then we can apply the lemma once more and we can keep doing that until we either run out of countable ordinals, or until we find an uncountable
Lemma 14. For all α < ω1, the set
is Borel. In particular, for φ ∈ Lω 1 ,ω and γ < ω1, the set
is also Borel. 
if and only if
By inductive hypothesis, all these conditions are Borel and therefore our set is Borel. Now, by the definition of the Scott height, α(M) < γ if and only if
By the first part, this condition is Borel.
Lemma 15. If a Lω 1 ,ω -sentence φ has continuum many non-isomorphic countable models, then there are countable ordinals α < β, with Xα(φ) a standard Borel space, a perfect set P and continuous functions t : P → Xα(φ), M : P → M od(φ) such that:
• for all x = y ∈ P , t(x), t(y) are distinct types in Xα(φ),
• for all x ∈ P , M (x) is a countable model of φ that realizes t(x) and has Scott height < β.
Moreover, we can assume that for x = y ∈ P , M (x) t(y).
Proof. Let α < ω1 be the least ordinal with Φα(φ) uncountable. Then Φγ (φ), γ < α, are all countable and applying lemma 13, we conclude that Xα(φ) is a standard Borel space and Φα(φ) is Σ 1 1 . Consider an ordinal β > α large enough so that the set
is still uncountable. By lemma 14 this is again Σ 1 1 . Consequently, it embeds a perfect set. So, let P a perfect set with
a continuous embedding. Then every t(x), x ∈ P , has the form φ
This is not empty and by lemma 14 and since t is continuous, it is Borel. By Jankov-von Neumann Uniformization theorem (cf. [1] ), we get a function x → M (x) that is Baire measurable and for all x ∈ P , (x, M (x)) is in the above set. Restricting the domain to a comeager set C ⊂ P we can further assume that x → M (x) is continuous on C. Let
Since t is 1-1 and M (x) can satisfy only countably many α-types, R0 is comeager in C 2 . By theorem 19.1 of [1] , we can find a Cantor set C1 ⊂ C such that (C1) 2 ⊂ R0, and then for all x, y ∈ C1,
which proves the lemma.
Note: The previous lemma is the only place where we use the assumption ℵ1 < 2 ℵ 0 . Observe also that for x = y ∈ P , M (x) |= t(x), while M (y) t(x), which implies that M (x) ≇ M (y).
Lemma 16. The set A0 := {M|∃x ∈ P (M ∼ = M (x))} is Borel.
Proof. We need first that the set A1 := {(x, M)|M ∼ = M (x), x ∈ P } is Borel. Since for all x ∈ P the Scott height of M (x) is < β,
This last condition is Borel by lemma 14. By the observation that for x = y ∈ P , M (x) ≇ M (y), we can also conclude that if (x1, M), (x2, M) are both in P , then x1 = x2. By the Lusin-Novikov theorem, the projection of A1 (on the second component) is also Borel and this is exactly what we have to prove.
Corollary 17. There is a sentence φ + ∈ Lω 1 ,ω such that for every count-
Proof. A0 is obviously invariant under isomorphisms and by the previous lemma is Borel. Therefore,there exists a Lω 1 ,ω sentence φ + as in the statement.
Lemma 18. If N is a model of φ + , countable or uncountable, and it satisfies one of the α-types {t(x)|x ∈ P }, then it actually satisfies the Scott sentence s(x) of M (x).
Proof. Recall here that a countable model can satisfy only one of the α-types {t(x)|x ∈ P }. If N is countable and satisfies φ + , then it belongs toA0, i.e. it is isomorphic to one of the M (x), x ∈ P . If N |= t(x), then M (x) ∼ = N and obviously N |= s(x). Therefore, assume that N is uncountable with N |= t(x), some x ∈ P . Let s(x) be the Scott sentence of M (x) and F the fragment generated by φ + , t(x) and s(x). Let N0 be a countable model with N0 ≺F N .
Then N0 |= φ + and N0 |= t(x). As in the countable case, N0 |= s(x), which implies that N |= s(x).
Using all these lemmas we are ready to prove Theorem 19. If φ has 2 ℵ 0 many non-isomorphic countable models, then there exists a partition of φ into continuum many sentences.
Proof. Assume that P, α, x → t(x), x → M (x) and φ + are as above.
Claim 1. It suffices to find a Lω 1 ,ω -sentence φ * that expresses the fact that our model satisfies one of the α-types {t(x)|x ∈ P }.
Proof. (of claim) First we need that every model of φ + is also a model of φ * . Arguing as before let N |= φ + , F be the fragment generated by both φ + and φ * , and N0 ≺F N a countable model. Then, there exists x ∈ P with N0 ∼ = M (x) and N0 |= t(x). By definition, N0 |= φ * which also implies that N |= φ * . Combining this with the previous lemma, we conclude that every countable or uncountable model of φ + will satisfy one of the Scott sentences {s(x)|x ∈ P }. Therefore, {φ ∧ ¬φ + } ∪ {s(x)|x ∈ P, s(x) is the Scott sentence of M (x)} gives a partition of φ into continuum many sentences.
Towards constructing φ * , let S := γ<α Ψγ (φ). By assumption on α, S is countable and for all x ∈ P , t(x) ∈ Xα(φ)
ω , n∈N Sû ↾n is an element of {t(x)|x ∈ P } and every t(x) in this set can be written as n∈N Sû ↾n , for someû ∈ 2 ω .
Consider the sentence:
It is obvious that every model of φ * will satisfy one of the α-types t(x), x ∈ P .
Main Result
We work as before with a countable L. Throughout this section we will not distinguish between a model M and its isomorphism class [M]S ∞ . So, when we say that a sentence has countably many countable models, we actually mean countably many non-isomorphic countable models.
Definition 20. For a theory T = {φα|α < 2 ℵ 0 } define T0 := {φ ∈ T |¬φ has countably many countable models}, T1 := {φ ∈ T |¬φ has ℵ1many countable models}, T2 := {φ ∈ T |¬φ has 2 ℵ 0 many countable models}, and
Note that the sets T0, T1 and T2 are disjoint, while the sets X0(T ), X1(T ) and X2(T ) may not be disjoint. Also, all sentences in T1 provide counterexamples to Vaught's Conjecture.
Definition 21. In case that |X(T )| ≥ |T1| we will say that T1 is small in T , or if T is apparent, we will just say that T1 is small. Smallness assumption for T1 will be crucial for our main result (theorem 26). If |X(T )| = ℵ0, then T1 = T2 = ∅ and if {Mn|n ∈ ω} enumerate the models in X0 and {φn|n ∈ ω} enumerate their Scott sentences, then it is easily seen that T is equivalent to n ¬φn.
So, we can assume that |X(T )| is uncountable. We will split the proof in various cases given by corresponding lemmas.
Lemma 22. If X2(T ) = ∅, then T is independently axiomatizable.
Proof. In this case there is a sentence, say φ0, such that ¬φ0 has continuum many non-isomorphic countable models. By theorem 19 we know that there are sentences {ψα|0 < α < 2 ℵ 0 } that partition ¬φ0. Define a new theory
Claim 2. T and T ′ are semantically equivalent.
Proof. (of claim)
Proof. (of claim) Let α < 2 ℵ 0 and fix a model Mα with Mα |= ψα. By the assumption that the ψα's partition ¬φ0, we get that Mα |= ¬φ0 and for all other β = α, Mα |= ¬ψ β . Therefore,
This means that T ′ \ {φα} φα and T ′ is independent.
Therefore, T is independently axiomatizable.
Lemma 23. If X2(T ) = ∅ and |X0(T ) \ X1(T )| = |X(T )| ≥ |T1|, then T is independently axiomatizable.
Proof. Before we start we need a lemma that essentially is due to Reznikoff (cf. [3] ) and also appears in [2] . We include the proof for completeness.
Lemma 24. Let C, D be disjoint sets of sentences with |D| ≤ |C|. If for every φ ∈ C, C ∪ D \ {φ} φ, then C ∪ D is independently axiomatizable.
1 Note here that both ψα and φα are defined for α > 0.
Proof. Let f : D → C be a 1-1 function. Then the set
is independent and semantically equivalent to C ∪ D.
Assume that |X(T )| = κ ≥ ω1. By the previous lemma it suffices to find a theory
n |n ∈ N} and {φ (α) n |n ∈ N} be an enumeration of the (countably many) countable models of ¬φα and their Scott sentences respectively. Define
i.e. we get the conjunction of all the Scott sentences that neither did they appear at a previous step nor their countable model is in X1(T ). If the conjunction is empty we ignore it. By assumption |X0(T ) \ X1(T )| = |X(T )| = κ and there have to be κ many φα's that are not empty. Let
Thus, φα → φα and
We need to prove that M |= T0, which is equivalent to M |= φα, for all α,
n , for all α.
In other words, M |= ¬φ
n , for all α and n. Hence, assume that M |= φ (α) n , with α minimal with this property and some n. Since M |= T ′ 0 , the only case that this can happen is if M (α) n ∈ X1(T ). If M is not countable, we can pass to a countable elementary submodel (over an appropriate fragment), say M0 ≺ M. Then M0 ∼ = M (α) n and, therefore, there is φ ∈ T1 with M0 |= ¬φ. If the fragment was chosen to include φ, we also get that M |= ¬φ, contradicting the fact that M |= T1. n , it cannot satisfy any other Scott sentence and since ¬φ (α) n doesn't appear in any other φ β , we conclude that
n ∈ X1 and this would prevent ¬φ (α) n from being in the conjunction of φα. Contradiction. Putting everything together we get that
This finishes the proof.
Lemma 25. If X2 = ∅ and |X(T )| ≥ |T1|, then T is independently axiomatizable.
Again, by lemma 23 we are done. We know that the only case that a sentence φ can be in T1 is if for all countable α, both Φα(¬φ) and Ψα(¬φ) are countable. For every α < ω1 define new sets Cα(¬φ) and Sα(¬φ): φ ∅,M α ∈ Cα(¬φ) if and only if φ ∅,M α ∈ Φα(¬φ) and there are only countably many countable models of φ that satisfy φ ∅,M α , and σ ∈ Sα(¬φ) if and only if there exists a countable model M that satisfies some φ ∅,M α ∈ Cα(¬φ) and σ is its Scott sentence. Both Cα(¬φ) and Sα(¬φ) are countable for all α, since Φα(¬φ) is countable. We will distinguish three cases:
Case I: κ > ω1 and cf (κ) = ω1. Since
and κ > ω1, it must be that κ = λ. Since cf (κ) = ω1, there exists an ordinal γ < ω1 and κ non-isomorphic countable models in X1 of Scott height less than γ. Define inductively a new theory, considering the sentence ¬ψα at stage α < λ. Choose β larger than γ and replace ψα by
It is not hard to see that ψα is equivalent to the conjunction of ψ
α and ψ (1) α . Also, observe that ¬ψ (0) α has countably many countable models and all the countable models of ¬ψα of Scott height less than γ satisfy it. Repeating this for λ many steps we will get eventually a theory T ⋆ such that X0(T ⋆ ) will contain all countable models that are in X1(T ) that have Scott height < γ. By the assumption on γ,
Case II: κ > ω1 and cf (κ) = ω1. As before κ = λ, but the difference now is that we may not have an ordinal γ as before. Instead, assume that there are cardinals {µi|i < ω1} and countable ordinals {αi|i < ω1} such that
• for all i < j, ω1 < µi < µj ,
• for all i < j, αi < αj , and
• for j limit ordinal, sup i<j αi = αj , and
• for all i < ω1, the number of countable models in X1(T ) that have Scott height α with αi ≤ α < αi+1 is equal to µi.
This also yields a partition
such that for all i
• for all ψ ∈ T (1)
α and ψ (1) α . Also, ¬ψ (0) α has countably many countable models, while ¬ψ (1) α has ℵ1 many countable models, and all the countable models of ¬ψα of Scott height < αi+1 ≤ β satisfy ¬ψ (0) α . Eventually, after λ many steps we will get a theory T ⋆ such that X0(T ⋆ ) \ X1(T ⋆ ) contains at least µi many countable models M ∈ X1(T ) that have Scott height αi ≤ α(M) < αi+1. By the assumptions on the µi's,
Case III: κ ≤ ω1. Then λ ≤ ω1 and we can use Caicedo's theorem (in [2] ) that every set with ≤ ω1 sentences in Lω 1 ,ω is independently axiomatizable. Proof. Then |X(T )| ≥ |T1| and we can again apply theorem 26.
Reformulations and open questions
In this section we reformulate the previous theorems as statements about Borel sets and give some open problems. Recall that a collection of Borel sets B = {Bi|i ∈ I} is independent if B = ∅ and for every i ∈ I, j =i Bj \ Bi = ∅, and that two collections B, B ′ are equivalent if
Theorem 29. Every collection of Borel sets B = {Bi|i ∈ 2 ℵ 0 } with B = ∅ admits an equivalent independent collection.
Proof. The proof closely resembles the proofs of lemma 23 and lemma 22. We have two cases:
Case I: There is an i0 ∈ I, such that ∁Bi 0 , the complement of Bi 0 , is uncountable. Then we can partition ∁Bi 0 into continuum many sets
Claim 6. B and B ′ are equivalent.
Proof. (of claim)
Proof. (of claim) Let x ∈ Cj. By the properties of the Cj 's, we get that x ∈ ∁Bi 0 and x / ∈ C j ′ , for
Case II: For all i ∈ I, ∁Bi, the complement of Bi, is countable. Construct a new collection
If the set is equal to the whole space, we ignore it and proceed to the next one. Observe here that the the complement of B ′ j is a subset of the complement of Bj , which is countable by assumption. Therefore, it is Borel.
Claim 8. B and B
′ are equivalent.
Proof. (of claim) It is immediate that
Proof. (of claim) Fix j < 2 ℵ 0 and assume that B ′ j is not equal to the whole space. Say y ∈ ∁B ′ j witnesses this. Then, y ∈ ∁Bj and by definition y ∈ B ′ i , for all i > j. Similarly, y / ∈ B ′ j implies that y / ∈ i<j ∁Bi, which means that y ∈ i<j Bi. Then, y ∈ B ′ i , for all i < j, and over all,
In either case, we constructed an independent collection of Borel sets B ′ which is equivalent to B.
It would be interesting if we could derive theorem 26 from theorem 29. This would eliminate the extra assumptions of theorem 26.
Definition 30. Let T |=g φ mean that in all generic extensions every model of T is also a model of φ. This is a stronger notion than T |= φ and is related to T ⊢L ω 1 ,ω φ, but we will not define ⊢L ω 1 ,ω here. We can prove Theorem 31. If T |=g φ, then there are countably many sentences φ0, φ1, . . . ∈ T such that n φn |=g φ.
We now ask whether we can replace |= by |=g in theorem 26. The problem is that T and T ′ may not be semantically equivalent in a generic extension. This is an open question we did not consider. We can also reformulate this problem using the language of Boolean Algebras. We know that the Lω 1 ,ω -sentences form a σ-complete Boolean Algebra with φ ≤ ψ if and only if φ → ψ. Using theorem 31 we can prove that the σ-filter generated by a theory T is equal to T ′ = {ψ|T |=g ψ}.
Definition 32. A set A of sentences is called σ-filter independent, if for all φ, φ is not in the σ-filter generated by A \ {φ}.
The problem is given a set of sentences A to find another setA ′ such that
• A and A ′ generate the same σ-filter and
• A ′ is σ-filter independent.
• Definition 11: The set {M ∈ M od(L) : M |= ϕ(n1, ...nm)} became {M ∈ M od(L)|M |= ϕ(n1, ...nm)},
i.e. the symbol "|" replaced the symbol ":"
• Proof of Lemma 15: The set {(x, M) ∈ P × M od(φ)|M |= t(x), Scott height(M) < β}.
became {(x, M) ∈ P × M od(φ)|M |= t(x), α(M) < β},
i.e. α(M) replaced "Scott height(M)".
• Definition 21: The conjuction ¬φn.
became n ¬φn,
i.e. a subscript n was added.
• Proof of Lemma 25, Case III: A space was added in the citation of Caicedo's theorem. So, "... we can use Caicedo's theorem (in [2] )" became "we can use Caicedo's theorem (in [2] )".
• The statement of Theorem 26 was rewritten.
• Theorem 29, Claim 9: In the line that starts "Similarly, y / ∈ B ′ j ..., the next three instances of the variable x were replaced with the variable y. Also, the disjunction • Before Definition 30, in the sentence that starts "In either case...", the word "which" replaced the word "with".
